Dear Reader,
I suspect that as a CAFE reader, you have been following the twists and turns of the legal wrangling between the courts and the Trump administration with regard to the mistaken removal and imprisonment of Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a Maryland father and El Salvadoran national whom the government acknowledges was sent to El Salvador as a result of an “administrative error.” Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling upholding a lower court’s order that the administration “facilitate” Abrego Garcia’s release from the Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT), where he is currently being held (as far as we are aware), the government has continued its kabuki dance of making filings that are pretty much nonresponsive to the court’s demand for more information about what the government is actually trying to do to comply with the court’s order. Lost in all this, though, is a more fundamental question: What kind of “arrangement” could the United States possibly have with a corrupt, third-world dictator who has been credibly accused of engaging in rampant human rights violations in his own country? Well, there are some clues that might explain why the Trump administration doesn’t want anyone to know.
So let’s start with this agreement. In its most recent filing, the Trump administration suggests that it can’t disclose the details of the agreement with El Salvador because it is classified. This…is specious. Under the Constitution, the foreign affairs authority when it comes to treaties with foreign states – which have the force of law in the U.S. – is shared between the President and Congress. The President can negotiate such treaties, but the Senate must ratify them before they take effect. Practically, though, the executive branch might need to come to less formal “executive agreements” with other countries for a number of reasons. So Congress passed the Case Zablocki Act (hat tip to Brian Finucane of Just Security for the reference), which applies to
A non-binding instrument that is or will be under negotiation, is signed or otherwise becomes operative, or is implemented with one or more foreign governments…and could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the foreign policy of the United States.
At least once every month, the Secretary of State is required to present to the majority and minority leaders of both houses a list of such agreements, their text, and the legal authority under which they were negotiated. Clearly, the purpose of this Act is to 1) keep Congress in the loop to ensure that the President isn’t getting the U.S. tied up in shady deals (remember Iran-Contra?) and 2) to ensure accountability and transparency. In fact, the Act requires that within 120 days of the agreement becoming operative, the text of the agreement must be published on the Department of State’s website. And to the extent that Trump’s deal with El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, is “classified,” the Act also allows for publication with a “classified annex” (meaning, classification does not preclude transparency).
So, why all the secrecy? I mean, President Bukele released a propaganda video of the detainees arriving in his country, which was followed by a propaganda video by Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem inside the prison itself. Clearly, they want people to know what is happening. But…the devil, as always, is in the details, so it’s something about the terms that they want to keep hidden. And, we know that Trump isn’t going to do anything without getting something in return. Neither is Bukele, who’s known as the Trump of El Salvador. So what is the quid pro quo here?
There are two possibilities. The first is political. El Salvador has suffered from gang violence, led by Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, following decades of civil war from 1979 to 1992. According to an indictment brought by the Eastern District of New York against thirteen MS-13 gang members in 2022, various El Salvadoran administrations since the war ended entered into a “truce” with MS-13, in which the gang agreed to reduce homicides in the city “in exchange for transfers to less secure prisons, improved prison conditions, conjugal visits, cash payments, and other benefits and privileges.” The “truce” came to a halt, however, in 2015 after the U.S. government, which wanted to curb MS-13’s activity in the United States and bring them to justice here, increased pressure on El Salvador to return to restrictive prison conditions for gang members and extradite some of them to the U.S. In retaliation for the “truce” being lifted, MS-13 increased its violence both in El Salvador and in the U.S. In fact, the first Trump Justice Department created a task force, called Task Force Vulcan, to crack down on MS-13 in the U.S. – which is what led to the federal indictment noted earlier.
Enter Bukele. Bukele was elected in 2019, winning on a platform that promised to (once again) “crack down” on gang violence. But his party, Nuevas Ideas, began secretly working to gain the support of a critical group: Yep, MS-13. Bukele and his party negotiated with the gang to bring back the “truce,” which would include (according to the federal indictment) “financial benefits, control of territory, the ability to run the gang from prison, and the early release of gang members.” MS-13 also wanted assurance that they wouldn’t be extradited to the U.S., where they would face more punitive measures. (Having studied the drug cartels in Colombia, this was reminiscent of Pablo Escobar’s mantra, “Mejor una tumba en Colombia, que una carcel in los Estados Unidos” – which means, “Better a grave in Colombia than a jail cell in the United States.”) The same day Bukele’s party received a legislative majority in 2021, it removed the Attorney General and five members of the Supreme Court who had been working with the U.S. to take real action against MS-13. Buekele also released a major MS-13 leader whom the U.S. was seeking for extradition from prison.
In exchange, MS-13 “agreed to reduce the number of public murders in El Salvador, which politically benefitted the government, by creating the perception that the government was reducing the murder rate.” Indeed, Bukele’s popularity is the result of his so-called “Territorial Control Plan,” which involved building his supermax prison and his plan of mass incarceration – a plan which he credits for the drop in violence since he took office. Of course, the citizens of El Salvador aren’t privy to the secret negotiations Bukele made with MS-13 – details that were going to be made public when the U.S. government’s case against the MS-13 defendants went to trial. Which may explain why the Trump administration quietly dropped these charges last week and put the charged MS-13 members on the third plane bound for El Slavador (and which included Abrego Garcia). Among the defendants was one of the highest-ranking leaders of MS-13, Cesar Humberto Lopez-Larios, who was arrested last June and added to the earlier indictment (and who almost certainly will not face real punishment in El Salvador). A former FBI agent who spent years working on this and other gang cases called it “a historical loss,” especially in terms of getting critical intelligence about MS-13’s operations and members in the United States.
In short, both Trump and Bukele appear to be complicit in a plan to allow MS-13 to operate in El Salvador on its own terms, in exchange for making it look like both are “cracking down” on the gang in their respective countries. Of course, the fact that MS-13 will continue to operate in cahoots with the El Salvadoran government means that citizens of that country who are victims of the gang will continue fleeing to the United States, undercutting the Trump administration’s claim that it is trying to end the “invasion” of asylum seekers. Then again, Trump needs a steady influx of people to continue trying to cross the border in order to keep claiming the “national emergency” he is using to expand his authority. So it’s a win-win propaganda operation.
Are these details explicitly mentioned in the agreement Bukele and Trump have come up with? (You’d think they wouldn’t be, but then again we’re talking about an administration that invited a journalist into a Signal chat discussing classified war plans.) Maybe not, but to the extent they mention the release of specific MS-13 members who have already been indicted by the Justice Department, the Trump administration may be hoping to avoid closer scrutiny of why it is suddenly dropping the charges.
As I mentioned, that could be just one reason the Trump administration doesn’t want to reveal the details. The other reason is that the deal as written simply undercuts the Trump administration’s legal claim that it can’t do anything to secure Abrego Garcia’s return. The AP has quoted internal memos from El Salvador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which states that the country will “house these individuals for one (1) year, pending the United States’ decision on their long term disposition.” Meaning that the U.S., not El Salvador, is in control of what happens to the people sent there – undercutting recent claims made in court by the Justice Department that they are being held under the “domestic, sovereign authority” of El Salvador.
Either way, it’s clear that Trump doesn’t want the courts, Congress, or the American people to know exactly what kind of “deal” he has negotiated on our country’s behalf with a vicious dictator. One thing I am confident of, though, is that the truth will come out, especially in an administration as sloppy and incompetent as this one – and my guess is that it will be shadier than we ever imagined.
Stay Informed,
Asha
The Freedom Academy with Asha Rangappa: https://asharangappa.substack.com/p/whats-the-real-quid-pro-quo-with
¿Cuál es el verdadero quid pro quo con Bukele?
Estimado/a lector/a:
Sospecho que, como lector de CAFE, ha estado siguiendo los vaivenes judiciales entre los tribunales y la administración Trump respecto a la expulsión errónea y el encarcelamiento de Kilmar Abrego García, un padre de Maryland y ciudadano salvadoreño que el propio gobierno reconoce fue enviado a El Salvador por un “error administrativo”. Pese a que la Corte Suprema confirmó la orden de un tribunal inferior que obliga a la administración a “facilitar” la liberación de Abrego García del Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), donde aún se encuentra recluido (hasta donde sabemos), el gobierno ha continuado su danza kabuki presentando escritos que poco o nada responden a la exigencia del tribunal de explicar qué hace realmente para acatar la orden. Así se pierde de vista algo más fundamental: ¿qué tipo de “arreglo” puede tener Estados Unidos con un dictador del tercer mundo, corrupto y acusado de violaciones masivas de derechos humanos? Hay pistas que explicarían por qué la administración Trump no quiere que nadie se entere.
Comencemos con el acuerdo. En su escrito más reciente, la administración Trump alega que no puede revelar los detalles del pacto con El Salvador porque son información clasificada. Esto… es falaz. La Constitución reparte la autoridad en materia de tratados —que tienen fuerza de ley— entre el Presidente y el Congreso. El Presidente puede negociarlos, pero el Senado debe ratificarlos. En la práctica, el Ejecutivo recurre a “acuerdos ejecutivos” menos formales. Por eso existe la Ley Case Zablocki (Case Zablocki Act) —gracias a Brian Finucane de Just Security por la referencia—, que se aplica a
“un instrumento no vinculante que se negocie, se firme o entre en vigor, o se implemente con uno o más gobiernos extranjeros… y que pueda tener impacto significativo en la política exterior de Estados Unidos”.
Al menos una vez al mes, el secretario de Estado debe presentar a los líderes de ambas cámaras una lista de esos acuerdos, su texto y la base jurídica que los sustenta. El fin es 1) mantener informado al Congreso para evitar tratos turbios (¿recuerda Irán‑Contra?) y 2) garantizar transparencia y rendición de cuentas. La ley establece que, dentro de los 120 días posteriores a la entrada en vigor, el texto debe publicarse en el sitio web del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos (Department of State). Y si el pacto con Nayib Bukele es “clasificado”, la ley permite publicarlo con un “anexo clasificado” (es decir, la clasificación no impide la transparencia).
Entonces, ¿por qué tanto secreto? Bukele difundió un video propagandístico de los detenidos llegando a su país, seguido de otro de la secretaria de Seguridad Nacional, Kristi Noem, dentro de la prisión. Quieren que el público se entere de lo que pasa, pero… en los detalles está el diablo. Y sabemos que Trump no hace nada sin algo a cambio. Tampoco Bukele, apodado el Trump de El Salvador. ¿Cuál es entonces el quid pro quo?
Existen dos posibilidades. La primera es política. Tras el conflicto armado de 1979‑1992, El Salvador sufrió la violencia de Mara Salvatrucha, o MS‑13. Según una acusación del Distrito Este de Nueva York (Eastern District of New York) de 2022 contra trece miembros de MS‑13, varios gobiernos salvadoreños pactaron una “tregua” con la pandilla: menos homicidios a cambio de traslados a prisiones menos seguras, mejores condiciones, visitas conyugales, pagos en efectivo y otros beneficios. La “tregua” terminó en 2015, cuando EE. UU. presionó para endurecer las condiciones carcelarias y extraditar a algunos miembros; MS‑13 respondió con más violencia en ambos países. El primer Departamento de Justicia de Trump creó la Fuerza de Tarea Vulcan (Task Force Vulcan) para reprimir a MS‑13 en EE. UU., lo que derivó en la acusación citada.
Entra Bukele. Electo en 2019 con la promesa de “mano dura”, su partido, Nuevas Ideas, negoció a escondidas con MS‑13 el regreso de la “tregua”, que incluía “beneficios económicos, control territorial, la posibilidad de dirigir la pandilla desde prisión y liberación anticipada”. MS‑13 exigía además no ser extraditada. (Como decía Pablo Escobar: “Mejor una tumba en Colombia que una cárcel en los Estados Unidos”.) El mismo día en que Nuevas Ideas obtuvo mayoría legislativa en 2021, destituyó al fiscal general y a cinco magistrados de la Corte Suprema que colaboraban con EE. UU. contra MS‑13. Bukele también liberó a un líder de MS‑13 reclamado en extradición.
A cambio, MS‑13 “acordó reducir los asesinatos públicos en El Salvador, beneficiando políticamente al gobierno al crear la percepción de que bajaba la tasa de homicidios”. La popularidad de Bukele se basa en su “Plan de Control Territorial” —supercárcel y encarcelamiento masivo incluidos— al que atribuye la caída de la violencia. Los salvadoreños desconocen las negociaciones secretas con MS‑13, que saldrían a la luz en el juicio federal. Tal vez por eso la administración Trump retiró discretamente los cargos la semana pasada y envió a los acusados en el tercer avión rumbo a El Salvador (junto a Abrego García). Entre ellos iba un alto líder, César Humberto López‑Larios, arrestado en junio y añadido a la acusación. Un exagente del FBI calificó la decisión de “pérdida histórica” por la inteligencia que se perderá sobre MS‑13 en EE. UU.
En resumen, Trump y Bukele parecen cómplices de un plan que permite a MS‑13 operar en El Salvador mientras ambos presumen de “mano dura”. Que MS‑13 siga actuando con el gobierno significa que las víctimas seguirán huyendo a EE. UU., contradiciendo la narrativa de Trump sobre frenar la “invasión” de solicitantes de asilo. Además, Trump necesita un flujo constante de migrantes para mantener la “emergencia nacional” con la que amplía su poder. Propaganda de doble triunfo.
¿Figuran estos detalles en el acuerdo? (Podría no ser así, pero hablamos de una administración que invitó a un periodista a un chat de Signal con planes de guerra clasificados). Tal vez no, pero si se menciona la liberación de miembros de MS‑13 ya acusados, la administración Trump busca evitar escrutinio sobre la súbita retirada de cargos.
Esa podría ser una razón para ocultar el texto. La otra es que contradice el argumento legal de que no puede repatriar a Abrego García. La AP citó memorandos internos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores salvadoreño: el país “albergará a estas personas durante un (1) año, en espera de la decisión de Estados Unidos sobre su disposición a largo plazo”. Es decir, EE. UU., no El Salvador, controla su destino, refutando la afirmación del Departamento de Justicia de que están bajo “autoridad soberana interna” salvadoreña.
En todo caso, Trump no quiere que tribunales, Congreso ni ciudadanía sepan el “acuerdo” que ha negociado en nuestro nombre con un dictador brutal. Estoy segura de algo: la verdad saldrá a la luz —sobre todo en una administración tan chapucera e incompetente— y será más turbia de lo que imaginamos.
Manténgase informado/a,
Asha
The Freedom Academy with Asha Rangappa: https://asharangappa.substack.com/p/whats-the-real-quid-pro-quo-with